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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Robert Hoyt, Esq.
By Yasemin Sim Esmen
Robert Hoyt was General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Treasury between 2006 and 2009.
He oversaw legal aspects of policies implemented to manage the crisis, including the rescues of
Bear Stearns, AIG, and the U.S. Auto industry, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and the failure of Lehman Brothers, as well as the creation and implementation of the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP.) This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with
Mr. Hoyt.
From a legal standpoint, we need to get creative to help the government do what they
need to do to fight the crisis while respecting the word of law.
Bear Stearns was in trouble and J.P. Morgan was ready to buy it, but valuing the assets that
Bear Stearns held was an impediment. To meet this challenge, the government loaned money
to a legal entity that held these assets, which, in turn, secured the loan. J.P. Morgan was able
to complete the transaction and prevented bankruptcy for Bear Stearns. The same was not
true for Lehman Brothers, as the only suitor, Barclays, pulled out of the deal and there were
no other buyers. A government loan would not have solved their problems because Lehman
Brothers was undercapitalized and a loan would only lose tax-payers’ money. Hoyt said,
In the case of Lehman Brothers, we had the ability to support a private market
transaction, but the transaction had to be there. It was not within our power to create
the transaction or simply write a check.
The case with government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs,) was different in the sense that the
government could intervene with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In the summer of 2008,
Congress amended the regime for them and gave the government the authority for their
conservatorship or receivership.
We need to find sustainable legal solutions and programs.
Article 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which gave the Federal Reserve the authority to
make extraordinary loans, was used to help with many of the rescues at that time, such as
Bear Stearns and AIG. “We figured out a way to use 13(3) effectively to fight the crisis,” Hoyt
said.
However, Hoyt and his team decided it was not very sustainable, both legally and politically,
to continue using this article and realized that they needed Congress’s approval to reach a
sustainable program to help fight the crisis. This paved the way for TARP.
The TARP was in the amount of $700 billion. The idea of the executive branch of the
government committing this much money without approval from the Congress did
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not seem in the spirit of the Constitution. Furthermore, this was all happening in the
midst of a presidential campaign, and the idea of bailouts was controversial. It was
not ideal from a political perspective to continue with section 13(3) without
approval from Congress.
We need more tools, legally, to fight a potential future crisis than we have now, at the
time of this interview (November 25, 2019).
The government cannot make laws to prevent a crisis but can make laws to effectively fight
it. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, Congress amended Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act, which was used very broadly to fight the crisis and help institutions. In its new
form, this article cannot be used in the same way it was used during the 2008-09 financial
crisis. The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the Systemic Risk Exception were similarly
amended, preventing them from being used as they were during 2008-09 to fight the crisis.
So, the Congress, in the aftermath of the crisis, took away the tools that had worked
and did not replace them with new tools. They did approve reforms intended to
make another crisis less likely. But if there is another financial crisis, whoever is in
my seat will have a much more difficult time because there will be fewer tools
available.
_____________________________________
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